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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper represents a first attempt to measure the main trends in wealth 
inequality in Catalonia in the long run, ca. 1400-1800, focusing in particular on the 
town of Balaguer as a specific case study. Therefore, the investigation belongs to a 
recent and growing historiographical field, which is centered on the study of the 
dynamics in economic inequality in preindustrial Europe by employing, especially, 
fiscal sources that include wealth assessments. To this respect, a first contribution 
of this work is provided by the description and analysis of the features of the 
Catalan sources (estimes), which are of a similar nature as their equivalents in the 
Center and North of Italy, the rest of the territories of the Crown of Aragon in 
Spain and in the South of France. 
Even though only one case study is considered, and still in a preliminary way, 
the empirical evidence gathered for Balaguer matches quite well with some widely 
known patterns identified by previous studies on other European territories. In 
particular, as in the vast majority of the other European series, a secular trend of 
increasing wealth inequality is detected. Within this general tendency, however, data 
display falls and rises in economic inequality over the centuries. At the same time, 
the importance of the trend followed by the share of wealth owned by the 
wealthiest owners as a good indicator – or even a determinant – of the general 
economic inequality trends is confirmed.   
As far as possible explanatory hypotheses are concerned, the local evidence 
provided by the town of Balaguer indicate an important correlation between the 
trend followed by the economic conjuncture as a whole and the trend followed by 
wealth inequality. Nevertheless, this does not mean that other factors considered in 
the international literature, as for instance an increase in the extraction rate or the 
impact of a specific epidemic, which has not been tested yet in the Catalan case, 
might have played a relevant role in modulating the intensity of this correlation.  
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Today, the Gini coefficient is a popular tool, keenly used to describe inequali-
ties in statistical dispersion. The aim of statistical study of concentration is to de-
termine whether the sum of values is distributed evenly among the entities 
comprising the collective in question.1 The study should concern income or both 
movable assets and fixed property of the taxpayers. However, in the case of tax reg-
isters from the pre-industrial era we have no information on the above whatsoever. 
We can, using indirect methods, sketch a model of wealth concentration in the city 
as municipal councils used to draw from their own assessment of individual taxpay-
ers’ material status when fixing rates of the two types of taxes.2 
Municipal tax registers (so called szos) were drawn up in the form of books; the 
data is organised by names of streets. Next, the name and surname or only the sur-
name of each taxpayer is provided; in most cases, the register also includes addi-
tional information, like the profession or whether the taxpayer was an owner or a 
tenant of a building. Taxes were paid by both citizens of towns (who owned real 
estate) and tenants, most of whom formed part of the transient population, or were 
people who could not afford to assume citizenship. Most taxpayers are men. Actual 
amounts paid were provided in a column next to the taxpayers’ names.3 
The Gini coefficient value ranges from 0 to 1. Extreme values do not exist in 
reality, as 0 indicates thoroughly equal distribution of the funds between individu-
als, which means that all members of a given community have the same income or 
wealth at their disposal. Value 1 stands for an extremely unequal distribution 
whereby one person possesses the entire income or wealth. In reality, values below 
0.2 are considered as lacking concentration, 0.2-0.4 as weak concentration, 0.4-0.6 
as medium concentration, 0.6-0.8 as strong concentration, and 0.8 as very strong 
concentration.4 In 2013, Bulgaria had the highest Gini coefficient among the coun-
 
1 M. KOPCZYŃSKI, Podstawy statystyki. Podręcznik dla humanistów, Warsaw 2005, pp. 55-59. 
2 Research problems and the limits of the tax register are developed in: K. WAGNER, Tax Registers 
as a Tool for the Analysis of Wealth Inequalities in Selected Towns of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
17th Century and the Beginning of the 18th Century. Overview and Research Problems, in “Codrul Cosminului”, 
23, 2016 n. 1, pp. 7-18. 
3 K. WAGNER, Potop a Wielka Wojna Północna w Warszawie w świetle rejestrów podatkowych - przyczynek 
do porównania dwóch szwedzkich okupacji [The Deluge and the Great Northern War in Warsaw in light of 
tax registers], in “Saeculum Christianum”, 20, 2013, pp. 109-119. 
4 M. KOPCZYŃSKI, Podstawy statystyki, cit., p. 58. It is worth noting that the value of Gini 
coefficient calculated based on wealth is typically higher than the value calculated based on income.  
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tries of the European Union – 0.354, while Iceland boasted the lowest – 0.242. Po-
land was positioned between Croatia and Luxembourg with the value of 0.307, i.e. 
slightly higher than the EU average (0.305).5 
This paper’s goal is to determine whether the Gini coefficient value indeed re-
fers to the communities who are at a threshold of economic growth, and what is 
the correlation between the value of the coefficient and the town or city’s economic 
situation. Also, it is worthwhile to ponder the question: is there any correlation – 
noted by both Jan Luiten van Zanden and Guido Alfani6 – whereby the larger the 
town/city, the more visible the inequalities. Finally, how do the towns/cities of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth compare to those in Western Europe. 






Source: author’s own study based on ARCHIWUM NARODOWE W KRAKOWIE (ANK), AmK 2607, 
2623, 2717, 2649. 
Throughout the entire period in question, the Gini coefficient in Krakow was 
high – it oscillated between 0.58 and 0.78. These are not rare values – we know of 
cases of cities where the index reached as high as 0.8 in late Middle Ages or in the 
Modern Era.7 In reality, it indicates great discrepancies within the local community, 
especially in the first half of the century when the city’s economic development was 
driven by political factors, e.g. presence of the royal court there. Back then, 5% of 
the community paid almost 51% tax, while 10% of the most affluent residents paid 
64%. Thus the “bottom”, i.e. the poorest 5% paid less than 0.2% while 10% paid 
0.4% of the basic tax imposed on the entire town. 
In the years 1653 and 1692 the inequalities were being erased – in the mid-
century the index fell to 0.67 and towards its end to 0.58. Therefore, the basic mu-
nicipal tax was distributed a tad more evenly, which was reflected in the city’s mate-
rial structure – in the subsequent years, the poorest 5% paid tax 0.6% and 1%, 
 
5 European study of income and living conditions (EU-SILC) in 2013. A note prepared for the 
press conference held on 23 December 2014, GUS 
http://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5486/7/5/1/euro_badanie
_dochodow_i_warunkow_zycia_-eu-silc-_w_2013.pdf [access: 14/03/2016] 
6 J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Tracing the beginning of the Kuznets curve: western Europe during the early modern 
period, in “Economic History Review”, 48, 1995, n. 4, pp. 643-664; G. ALFANI, Economic Inequality in 
Northwestern Italy: A Long-Term View (Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries), in “The Journal of Economic 
History”, 75, 2015, n. 4, pp. 1058-1096; IDEM, Plague and distribution of property: Ivrea, Northen Italy 1630, 
“Population studies”, 64, 2010, n. 1, pp. 61-75. 
7 J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Tracing the beginning, cit., p. 648-649, 651; G. ALFANI, Economic Inequality in 
Northern Italy, cit., pp. 1069-1072; IDEM., Plague and distribution of property, cit., p. 63. 
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while 10% – 1.2% and 1.9% respectively. At the same time, participation of the 
most affluent group decreased (the top 5% paid on average 44% of the municipal 
tax while the upper 10% between 53% and 59%). 
Graph 1.  Kraków. The Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: author’s own study based on ANK, AmK 2607, 2623, 2717, 2649. 
Reducing the level of participation of the most affluent group in the overall 
sum of tax, including decreasing the Gini coefficient in 1653, corresponds with the 
conclusions of Guido Alfani in reference to the towns of Northern Italy. Alfani 
noted that events such as epidemics, or any other negative phenomena in the histo-
ry of a town, trigger a decrease in the Gini coefficient, due to the rise in mortality of 
the wealthier residents; therefore, it called for a more even distribution of financial 
benefits among a larger group of tax payers.8 
Yet another possibility that needs to be considered is a fact that wealthy resi-
dents were capable of leaving the area under threat and moving to a safe place. The 
space they had left behind was then filled by far less affluent newcomers from oth-
er towns (from the country or from abroad) who sought employment and possibili-
ties to make progress in larger towns. In such cases, two scenarios were feasible: a 
large volume of newcomers triggered a stagnation in the town’s development, or – 
in case of engaging in economic activities – the newcomers could join the financial 
elite of a given town.9 It is worth noting that a decrease in the Gini coefficient was 
 
8 G. ALFANI, Plague and distribution of property, cit., p. 63. 
9 IDEM, Wealth inequalities and population dynamics in Early Modern Northern Italy, in “Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History”, 40, 2010, n. 4, pp. 531-536, 539, 545; IDEM, Prima della curva di Kuznets: 
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not noticeable in the year when the calamity occurred but more often in the follow-
ing year. This phenomenon is easily discernible in the case of Kraków, where a de-
crease in the Gini coefficient in 1653 and next in 1692 was a result of the 
epidemics, the flood, and ultimately of the Swedish occupation. 
Return to wealth concentration at the hands of a small group was noted in 
Kraków in the early eighteenth century. Here, the disproportion was high: 5% of 
the most affluent residents paid slightly over 49% of tax, 10% paid as much as 
66%, while 5% and 10% of the most impoverished residents paid 0.02% and 0.04% 
respectively. This was by all means an exceptional situation – the tax register be-
longs to the registry of the Swedish contribution, which in reality means that in or-
der to ensure the tax was paid in the specified period of time to the occupying 
force, its largest part was imposed on the most affluent group of the city residents. 
Simultaneously, in such exceptional cases of levying the tax, the municipal councils 
had a tendency to protect the most impoverished residents at the expense of the 
local patriciate.10 
Tab. 2.  Occupational structure among the 20% of  payers of  the highest municipal 
tax in Kraków in the years 1635-1692 
 
Category 








5% 10% first 5%
second  
5% 10% 
Crafts 10 14 38 3 4 7 3 7 21 
Petty trade 3 13 15 1 2 2 5 4 6 
Merchants 25 7 3 3 3 3 10 6 7 
Services 1 5 2 1 2 4 1 - - 
Free professions and clerks 1 3 3 6 4 5 - - - 
Women 3 6 8 3 2 3 1 3 . 
Other 32 27 81 23 23 54 1 1 8 
TOTAL 75 75 150 40 40 78 21 21 42 
Source: author’s own study based on ANK, AmK 2607, 2623, 2717. 
 
Etàpreindustriale (1450-1850), G. ALFANI, M. BARBOT eds.,Venice 2009, pp. 143-167; IDEM, Plague and 
distribution of property, cit., p. 71. 
10 Hence for example 40% of the Kraków community in 1702 paid 0.7% of the tax 
contributions, while the ceiling of 1% was exceeded by mere half of the residents (1.6%). The table 
provided omits the year 1702 due to the exceptionally low percent of noting occupation of the tax 
payers by the person managing the resister, and due to problems with identifying specific individuals. 
The way in which the tax register was produced – little annotations on the occupations, lack of 
differentiating into tenants and house owners, as well as lack of information on the types of housing – 
all these suggest the necessity of speedy collection of tax and not paying much attention to the formal 
side of the process.  
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Occupational structure of the most affluent residents is a crucial element of the 
analysis. Table 1 presents the volume of specific occupational groups among 20% 
of people paying the highest tax for the city. Splitting the first decile into two 
groups aims at more detailed analysis of the occupational structure of the wealthiest 
residents in the successive years. According to the table, the most numerous 
groups, both in the first half of the seventeenth century and towards its end, were 
merchants who constituted between 1/3 and a half of all 5% of the most affluent 
residents. They were followed by artisans who dominated between 10% and 20% 
of the wealthiest residents – throughout the entire period covered by the study they 
constituted between ¼ and a half of payers of municipal tax within this group. The 
lowest number of merchants and artisans was noted in 1653, namely between the 
crises that beset the city, when it seems fairly likely that the representatives of these 
groups had left the city. In such periods, the participation of free professions and 
clerks rose within the wealthiest groups. Presence of women (and often of the cler-
gy, too) in the group of taxpayers on whom the highest sum was imposed may sug-
gest that they had inherited money, e.g. from their deceased husbands or relatives. 
This phenomenon was also observed in the towns and cities in Northern Italy.11 
According to Alfani’s study, “the plague effect” is short-lived. Following a cri-
sis, stratification should revert to the state from before the calamity, with those who 
had left the city in the face of danger returning. At the period of stabilization, the 
issues of inheritance from the deceased were explained, as it usually meant a signifi-
cant betterment of their material status. Finally, new arrivals would settle in the cit-
ies, often affluent ones; they would purchase abandoned properties and invest 
money in launching their professional careers. That in turn resulted in the repeated 
increase in the affluence of the small group of citizens, and thus a return to the 
state of things as they had been prior to the crisis.12 







Source: author’s own study based on AGAD, WE 832, 834, 836, 838, 1431. 
Alfani’s observation concerns only towns and cities whose economic develop-
ment was unhindered, and the only crisis to recover from was the problem of epi-
 
11 G. ALFANI, Plague and distribution of property, cit., pp. 64-67, 70; IDEM, Wealth inequalities and 
population dynamics, cit., p. 546. 
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demics or, e.g. a temporary military conflict.13 In the case of seventeenth-century 
Kraków these observations are not as relevant as they are in the case of Warsaw. 
From among all the towns under analysis only Warsaw demonstrated permanent 
tendency for development, momentarily curbed by singular events. 
In Warsaw, similarly to Kraków, we can observe a huge disproportion between 
the 5% and 10% groups of the wealthiest and the poorest residents. In 1655, i.e. in 
the first year of the occupation, the wealthiest group paid 55% of the municipal tax, 
while 10% of the most impoverished group only 1.3%. In the second year of the 
occupation a minimal decrease of the concentration index was noted – even though 
5% of the wealthiest residents continued to pay almost 1/3 of the tax, the remain-
ing tax was distributed more evenly, e.g. in 1655 groups between 50% and 70% 
paid respectively 2.7%, 3.9% and 4.9%; one year later the values grew to 3,8%, 
5.2% and 6.4%. Interestingly, the taxes imposed on the most impoverished resi-
dents remained unchanged for the duration of these two years (5% paid 0.6% tax, 
and 10% approximately 1.5%). 
Graph 2.  Warsaw. The Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: author’s own study based on ARCHIWUM GŁÓWNE AKT DAWNYCH W WARSZAWIE (AGAD), 
WE 832, 834, 836, 838, 1431. 
Following the Second Northern War Warsaw’s political and economic situation 
became stable. Almost fifty years after this military conflict had ended another war 
broke out, and yet again it affected the city’s situation. However, contribution regis-
ters from the years 1702-1704 demonstrate that a tendency of momentary decrease 
and next return to the large concentration of wealth that had been noted in Italian 
towns is also present in the king’s residence – the city of Warsaw. This is particular-
ly visible in 1704 when the index fell by almost 0.1. The situation was similar in the 
 
13 Ibid., p. 70. 
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second year of the Swedish occupation of Warsaw, at the time of the so-called Del-
uge, when the concentration levels fell as well. 
Tab. 4.  Occupational structure of  10% of  payers of  the highest municipal tax in 





first 5% second 5% first 5% 
second 
5% 
Artisans 4 3 4 4 15 
Petty trade - 1 - 1 2 
Merchants 5 2 11 4 22 
Services 2 1 1 2 6 
Free professions and clerks 8 7 19 9 43 
Foreigners - - 1 - 1 
Women 3 4 1 - 8 
Other 2 7 24 42 75 
TOTAL 24 25 61 62 172 
Source: author’s own study based on AGAD, WE 832, 834, 836, 838, 1431. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the occupational structure of Warsaw residents re-
vealed that people with free professions and clerks dominated at the time. They 
were then followed by merchants and artisans. Surely, this is due to the specific na-
ture of Warsaw as the city where the monarch, the nobility and magnates who 
served various state functions resided, as well as to the activities of municipal au-
thorities. 
It was somehow different in the case of seventeenth-century Lwów. Here the 
Gini coefficient had a growing tendency, meaning an increase in the concentration 
of wealth at the hands of a very small group of people. The distribution of tax in 
the first half of the century was exceptionally even, especially for the Modern era. 





Source: author’s own study based on CENTRALNYJ DERŻAWNYJ ARCHIW UKRAINI U LWOWIE 
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ters from the years 1702-1704 demonstrate that a tendency of momentary decrease 
and next return to the large concentration of wealth that had been noted in Italian 
towns is also present in the king’s residence – the city of Warsaw. This is particular-
ly visible in 1704 when the index fell by almost 0.1. The situation was similar in the 
 
13 Ibid., p. 70. 
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second year of the Swedish occupation of Warsaw, at the time of the so-called Del-
uge, when the concentration levels fell as well. 
Tab. 4.  Occupational structure of  10% of  payers of  the highest municipal tax in 





first 5% second 5% first 5% 
second 
5% 
Artisans 4 3 4 4 15 
Petty trade - 1 - 1 2 
Merchants 5 2 11 4 22 
Services 2 1 1 2 6 
Free professions and clerks 8 7 19 9 43 
Foreigners - - 1 - 1 
Women 3 4 1 - 8 
Other 2 7 24 42 75 
TOTAL 24 25 61 62 172 
Source: author’s own study based on AGAD, WE 832, 834, 836, 838, 1431. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the occupational structure of Warsaw residents re-
vealed that people with free professions and clerks dominated at the time. They 
were then followed by merchants and artisans. Surely, this is due to the specific na-
ture of Warsaw as the city where the monarch, the nobility and magnates who 
served various state functions resided, as well as to the activities of municipal au-
thorities. 
It was somehow different in the case of seventeenth-century Lwów. Here the 
Gini coefficient had a growing tendency, meaning an increase in the concentration 
of wealth at the hands of a very small group of people. The distribution of tax in 
the first half of the century was exceptionally even, especially for the Modern era. 





Source: author’s own study based on CENTRALNYJ DERŻAWNYJ ARCHIW UKRAINI U LWOWIE 




The wealthiest 5% of the community paid less than 14% of tax, and 10% mere 
25% of the municipal tax, which is low when compared with Warsaw or Kraków. 
At the same time, the poorest residents paid relatively high taxes – 1.4% of tax for 
5% of the community and 3.5% for 10%. That means that the value of tax was 
evenly distributed among all the residents of the city. It would be wrong to con-
clude from this that seventeenth-century Lwów did not have a financial elite; it was 
rather due to the conscious policy of the municipal authorities with regard to tax. It 
was not until the political upheavals in the seventeenth century that the municipal 
council was forced to reach for the rich men’s pocket, which soon resulted in a 
prompt rise of the index. 
In 1665, i.e. following the crisis of the mid-seventeenth century, the participa-
tion of more affluent residents in tax issues increased (10% of the wealthiest resi-
dents paid 31% of the tax) with the simultaneous decrease of tax amount paid by 
5% and 10% of the poorest residents (decrease to 0,7% and 1,7% respectively). 
One can observe a minimal rise in wealth concentration, and consequently a rise of 
the Gini coefficient, as well as a tendency to protect the less affluent group of resi-
dents from excessive exploitation, similarly to Warsaw and Łódź. 
Graph 3.  Lwów. The Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: author’s own study based on CDIAUL, AmLw, f. 52, op. 2, nr 777, 782, 795. 
A shift in wealth concentration happened in the early eighteenth century. The 
Gini coefficient rose to 0.604 and 10% of the most affluent residents paid almost 
47% of tax. This is the only city where such a change occurred. The question arises: 
can we explain this change by the renewal of Lwów’s trade relations with the towns 
of right-bank Ukraine and Podolia after these territories had been regained in 1699. 
It seems striking that in the first period under scrutiny, in 1636, i.e. at the time 
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when the trade was uninterrupted, the income inequalities in Lwów were very low. 
Therefore, the atypical results seem to reflect a specific Polish fiscal policy rather 
than changes in the economic situation. Such thesis is confirmed by yet another ob-
servation – the concentration index from 1702 is close to those achieved by War-
saw and Kraków, while the earlier indices could be compared with those of Poznań 
and Lublin. 
 Tab. 6.  Occupational structure amongst 20% of  payers of  the highest tax according 
to municipal tax registers from Lwów in the years 1636-1702 
 
 



















Craft 5 4 5 3 2 2 - 2 9 32 
Petty trade - - - - - - - - - - 
merchants 2 1 4 2 4 3 2 - 3 21 




- - - 2 - 4 6 4 5 21 
foreigners 1 3 5 - - - 2 3 3 17 
women 3 2 3 2 3 2 - 1 3 19 
other 23 20 48 9 11 26 12 11 18 178 
TOTAL 35 31 67 18 20 37 22 21 42 293 
Source: author’s own study based on CDIAUL, AmLw, f. 52, op. 2, nr 777, 782, 795. 
In Lwów, similar to seventeenth-century Kraków, merchants and artisans led 
the group of the most affluent residents. Due to the high percentage of unidentified 
persons – located in the ‘other’ category – it is impossible to sketch a reliable cross-
section of the occupation structure of the wealthiest group. 
Distribution of municipal tax in Poznań and Lublin was exceptionally even and 
remained on the level of ca 0.4 for the entire period under analysis, therefore these 
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Tab. 7.  Wealth concentration in Poznań (1626-1702) and Lublin (1627-1670). The Gini 
coefficient  
Poznań Lublin 
year Gini year Gini 
1626 0.378 1627 0.379 
1651 0.367 1654 0.382 
1675 0.387 1670 0.397 
1702 0.358   
Source: author’s own study based on ARCHIWUM PAŃSTWOWE W POZNANIU (APP), AmP I 1759, I 
1765, I 1844, I 1851; ARCHIWUM PAŃSTWOWE W LUBLINIE (APL), AmL 272, 278, 293.  
The structure of wealth distribution in the two cities in all periods is exception-
ally even and reminiscent of the values typical of contemporary European cities. 
The participation of 5% of the poorest residents in taxes ranges between 0.5% and 
1%, and the wealthiest between 12% and 20%. Wealth distribution in these two cit-
ies is similar to the Dutch province of Overijssel in the mid-eighteenth century. Jan 
Luiten van Zanden noted a significant disproportion there between the three larger 
Hanseatic towns – Deventer, Kampen and Zwolle – and the regions of Twente, 
Salland and Vollenhove. The three larger towns reached the level 0.64 of the Gini 
coefficient, which in the Modern era is typical of larger towns where differences in 
wealth were more pronounced that in the more homogenous rural areas. 






Twente (total) 0.36 
Town 0.45 
Wise 0.32 
Salland (total) 0.39 
town 0.39 
Wise 0.39 
Vollenhove (total) 0.36 
town 0.44 
Wise 0.32 
TOTAL FOR THE PROVINCE 0.49 
Source: J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Tracing the beginning, cit., p. 648. 
Salland, a region to the east of the German-Dutch border, is closest to Poznań 
and Lublin. There is no difference between small towns and villages of the region; 
moreover, an average income per one house in the towns of the region was slightly 
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lower than in the villages there.14 Similar values were achieved by other Dutch vil-
lages already in the sixteenth century – in 1561 it reached 0.35 and in 1732 – 0.38. 
Similarly low differentiation was noted for the other less urbanized regions. 
Graf  5.  Poznań. The Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: author’s own study based on APP, AmP I 1759, I 1765, I 1844, I 1851. 
Poznań and Lublin reached similar values of the index and wealth concentra-
tion, which is clearly illustrated by the enclosed charts. In the case of both cities the 
lines practically concur, which testifies to the fact that the distribution of wealth 
structure is almost unchanged. It is worth noting that, even if Poznań or Lublin was 
no different from Warsaw and Lwów with regard to the number of families paying 
the municipal tax, the index and wealth concentration values have little in common 
with the value typical for large towns/cities, but are comparable with values typical 
for the aforementioned rural areas in Western Europe.  
What conclusions can we draw from all the collected data? From among the 
five cities under analysis, only two – Kraków and Warsaw – have indices typical of 
large cities, boasting wealth concentration typical of such cities. High values are not 
specific for these two centres. The Gini coefficient for Amsterdam between 1561 
and 1808 ranged between 0.57 and 0.61, for the three largest towns of the Overijs-
sel province it equalled 0.64, and for the towns in Northern Italy it ranged between 
0.65 and as high as 0.85. 
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Graph 6. Lublin. The Lorenz Curve 
 
 
Yet another characteristic of large towns or cities – linked directly to the high 
value of the Gini coefficient – are the financial elites who paid the highest tax. In 
both above mentioned cities the participation of 5% of the most affluent residents 
ranged between 35% and 50% of the sum assigned for the entire town. Taxpayers 
represented mainly trade-related professions, followed by the representatives of 
less-prestigious artisanry. 
Let us recap: a certain Italian scholar studied the effects of elementary crises on 
the economic development of cities and on wealth concentration and indicated an 
additional factor which must be considered while analysing the idea of a big-city. 
Guido Alfani was of an opinion that, aside from the high concentration factor, 
large cities can be characterized by a brief decrease of the Gini coefficient in the 
situation of a crisis (e.g. epidemics); the coefficient continues to grow after the situ-
ation is stable again. This is the case of Warsaw which coped far better with the 
singular – and brief – crises thanks to the city’s systematic development. The im-
pulse for development stemmed from the fact that the city served a political func-
tion – it was here that the sejm was located, as well as kings’ residence and the 
homes of magnates and the nobility. Political factors allowed for the economic de-
velopment of the city, and in the case of crisis they enabled a speedy recovery. 
According to the register of contributions of 1702, the effect of the damages 
incurred by the Swedish Deluge on wealth inequalities was minimal. If we were to 
analyse the register of 1702 only for Kraków, we would be eager to draw similar 
conclusions. However, the situation there in 1692 was altogether different – a much 
more even wealth structure and a more evened-out wealth distribution was noted 
back then. It seems that in the face of a threat posed by the Swedish occupying 
force, Kraków municipal authorities decided to impose a higher tax on the more 
affluent group of residents in order to protect the impoverished taxpayers. Such 
practice, driven by the need for a speedy and smooth tax collection, and paying the 
war tax in order to eliminate any prospective negative effects of the occupation in 
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the city. In the case of seventeenth-century Kraków we can see a slow evening out 
of the wealth structure, which in all likelihood could be explained by losing its rep-
resentative function as the king’s residence and by a slower pace of coping with the 
political or economic crises. 
Lublin and Poznań belong to yet another group of towns which boasted a flat 
wealth structure, discernibly distinct from the big-city one. Perhaps it could be at-
tributed to the aforementioned fact of economic stagnation in these towns, dating 
back to the period prior to the destruction of the mid-seventeenth century (Poz-
nań) and the difficult process of reconstruction following the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury crisis, which is evident by the small numbers of newcomers arriving to settle 
there.15 Finally, the impulse to enliven the municipal economy (such as the presence 
of the royal court in the case of Warsaw) was lacking. 
Lwów can be positioned somewhere between these two groups – it does not fit 
the pattern for it gained impetus for the development in the early eighteenth centu-
ry, following the period of the seventeenth-century stagnation. It is difficult to tell 
whether these are the effects of the peace treaty signed in Karłowice and of regain-
ing control over right-bank Ukraine with Podolia and Kamenets Podolski, or per-
haps this is simply due to the changes in repartition of tax by the municipal council. 
Further study of wealth inequalities in the eighteenth century is necessary to deter-
mine whether the tendency for financial dominance of a small group of burghers 




Summing up the first section, we must stress that the big-city status in seven-
teenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could be described by three fac-
tors: significant wealth inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, the type of 
housing development and the number of tenants. Indices typical of seventeenth-
century big cities reached high values, therefore urban communities comprised a 
small group of financial elites. This was certainly the case of Warsaw, and partially 
of Kraków, too: these cities reached values comparable with e.g. Amsterdam in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. In Poznań and Lublin, wealth stratification was 
scarce, whereas Lwów did not fit the model – it did boast big wealth stratification 
but no earlier than the early eighteenth century. 
Despite the mid-seventeenth century crisis, the entire period in question may 
be characterized by a consistent rise in the number of masonry buildings, which is 
contrary to the general view promoted in literature and pointing to the deep crisis 
following the Swedish Deluge which thwarted the construction process. Quite of-
ten the departure of residents from towns and cities, and stagnation that followed 
are linked to the above-mentioned crisis; meanwhile, tax registers indicate that in-
deed there was a migration movement, mainly on the part of tenants, but in the 
case of big-cities such as Warsaw or Kraków, the increase happened as soon as the 
situation was stabilized. 
 
15 J. DE VRIES, The Economic Crisis of the Seventeeth Century after Fifty Years, in “Journal of 
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Following the analysis of these three factors, we are left with a group of cities 
with big-city characteristics (Warsaw, Kraków) as well as a duo which lacks the 
traits of a big-city (Poznań, Lublin) and finally Lwów which is placed somewhere in 
between these two groups, being decidedly different from both. Unfortunately, the 
number of taxpayers from different ethnic groups are limited in the source (not 
everybody paid taxes), so we cannot conclude about the impact of those groups. 
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The general objective of this paper is to present the initial results of a research 
project that began just over a year ago and whose aim was to study the evolution of 
inequality in Catalonia during medieval and early modern times based on different 
types of documentary sources and economic parameters. The project continues a 
long tradition of studies on taxation and feudal income in this area of the Iberian 
Peninsula, many of which have had taxation on wealth as their central theme. 
Indeed, thanks to research carried out over the past 30 years, the origin, functioning 
and evolution of this essentially municipal type of taxation has been reconstructed 
and the foundations laid for producing an exhaustive archive of documentation 
related to the collection of the aforementioned tax.1 
In order to be able to contribute to a better knowledge of the issue of inequality 
on the basis of abovementioned, we believe that we should begin with an analysis 
of the scope and limits of the extraordinary sources conserved in Catalonia between 
the 14th and 18th centuries. Specifically, we are interested in discussing three 
fundamental circumstances: first, the diverse origin and varied typology of sources 
available in the Catalan archives for the study of the subject; secondly, the 
magnitude of the preserved archives and the consequent possibility of producing a 
broad and coherent sample; and, thirdly, the precautions that must be taken when 
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